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WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
At the other extreme is In re Ampco Metal Inc., 28 where it
was held that union officers were justified in uniting with the
majority of the union, or, stated differently, that loyalty to the
union and its members exceeds loyalty to the company. In that
case the union president and vice-president actively led a work-
stoppage, wrote handbills, had them printed and passed them
out on company time, all in disregard of the grievance machin-
ery. Discharge was held to be too severe a penalty.
An intermediate position may be found in In re Bethlehem
Steel Company.29 In that case union officers were discharged
for instigating a strike. Although they participated in a picket
line and failed to do everything in their power to end the strike,
it was held that discharge was too severe a penalty on the ground
that the above conduct did not amount to "instigating a strike."
In In re American Steel and Wire Company,30 where "condoning
a strike" was defined as not making an effort to prevent it, it
was said that there must be a reasonable effort on the part of
union officers to prevent any unauthorized strike.
HARRISON KING
INSUBORDINATION
I. NATURE OF THE OFFENSE
This note is intended to give an arbitrator who has a case
involving insubordination a bird's-eye view of the decisions of
other arbitrators. I have excluded from this article a large
group of cases in which the central point is refusal to accept
a job assignment.,
At the outset, it should be noticed that we are dealing with
an organization-usually an industrial plant. Implicit in the
word "organization," itself, is the idea of authority, for how
28. In re Ampco Metal, Inc. and Employees' Mutual Benefit Association,
3 LA 375 (1946).
29. In re Bethlehem Steel Company, Williamsport Plant and UnitedSteelworkers of America, Local 2499 (CIO), 2 LA 194 (1945).
30. In re American Steel and Wire Company of New Jersey, Cuyahoga
Works, and United Steelworkers of America, Local 1298 (CIO), 5 LA 193(1946).
1. There is a logical basis for this exclusion, although the issues do
overlap. For a case involving refusal to accept a work assignment where
the discipline imposed was grounded on insubordination, see In re Goodyear
Clearwater Mills and United Textile Workers of America, Local 90 (AFL),
6 LA 117 (1947).
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could the purpose of the organization be carried out if the men
were free to work in their own ways? Authority is vested in
management, and rightly so, for management, in an industrial
plant, is responsible for production-both to the public and to
the stockholders-and authority is a necessary concomitant of
responsibility.2 Authority includes not only the right to give
orders but also the power to compel obedience to them. To en-
force this latter right, management is given the power to dis-
cipline recalcitrant workers.
In order to protect the rights of workers secured by collective
bargaining contracts and to prevent arbitrary action by man-
agement, an orderly grievance procedure is normally set up in
each plant. But production cannot wait until the merits of a
grievance are determined. The worker must obey the order,
file a grievance, and then receive his just deserts at the hands
of an impartial arbitrator. Should he fail to follow this proce-
dure, by denying the authority of management and refusing to
obey an order, he risks the supreme industrial penalty, discharge.
Whether or not conduct warrants discharge is the issue in many
arbitrated cases. That issue will be discussed subsequently, with
the factors to be considered and weighed in making that deter-
mination.
What is "insubordination"? Webster defines it as the "Quality
or state of being insubordinate; mutiny."' 3 In a case at law it
was said, "Insubordination certainly implies intentional, willful,
disobedience." 4 The first definition is not very helpful, for it
includes within it the word to be defined. The second is closer
because it attempts to show some of the constituent elements.
Perhaps an even better definition can be gleaned from some of
the arbitrated cases.
First, there must be an order directed to the employee either
to do, or to refrain from doing something, and it must be under-
stood by the employee to be an order. This rules out words by
2. For an expression of this idea in an excellent opinion by Harry
Shulman, see In re Ford Motor Company, Spring & Upset Building and
International Union, United Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Imple-
ment Workers of America, Local 600 (CIO), 3 LA 779 (1944).
3. Webster's New International Dictionary (2d ed., 1945).
4. Matter of Griffin v. Thompson (1911) 202 N. Y. 104, 113, 95 N. E. 7, 9.
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a supervisor in the nature of an inquiry as to whether the em-
ployee would like to do a certain task.
Normally the person giving the order is a recognized fore-
man, or other supervisory employee, and the only question is
one concerning the responsive action of the worker receiving
the direction. In at least two cases, however, the authority of
the person giving the order has been challenged. In one, it was
held that a worker is required to obey a general order and from
a person known by the worker to be a foreman, even though
the worker was not directly under the particular foreman. But
discharge was considered too severe a penalty in view of the
fact that it was not expressly published in the plant that men
were to obey general orders given by all foremen. In the otherT
the worker refused to obey an order on the ground that the
man giving it was not in fact an assistant foreman. It was held
that the refusal to obey was inexcusable as the man had "the
cloak of apparent authority." Thus, there must not only be an
order, but the person giving it must have either actual or ap-
parent authority to do so.
Turning now to the conduct of the employee responsive to
the order, in general, any challenge of the authority of the fore-
man or any refusal to do as instructed is termed "insubordina-
tion" and such conduct merits discipline, unless the incident is
so minor that it may be overlooked.8 Thus, refusal to speed
up work when told to,9 or refusal to correct poor work,10 or
refusal to take a day off when instructed," or refusal to do a
5. In re Dairymen's League Cooperative Association, Inc. and Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of
America, Local 584 (AFL), 11 LA 1113 (1948).
6. In re John Deere Tractor Company and United Automobile, Aircraft
and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, Local 838 (CI0), 4 LA
161 (1946).
7. In re Finders Manufacturing Company and International Union,
United Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Implement Workers of
America, Local 734 (CI0), 3 LA 846 (1946).
8. In re Utah Ice and Storage Company and United Packinghouse
Workers of America, Local 410 (CIO), 10 LA 814 (1948).
9. In re Fruehauf Trailer Company and International Union, United
Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Implement Workers of America,
Local 99 (CIO), 4 LA 399 (1946).
10. In re Micamold Radio Corporation and United Electrical, Radio &
Machine Workers of America, Local 430 (CIO), 3 LA 459 (1946).
11. In re Ranney Refrigerator Company and United Automobile, Air-
craft and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, Local 308 (CI0),
5 LA 621 (1946).
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task on the ground that it is "janitor's work,"' 2 or nose-thumb-
ing and saluting the foreman 3 are all clear cases of insubordi-
nation.
Generally speaking, to be guilty or insubordination, the worker
must not only challenge authority, but must also actually dis-
obey it. Thus, where a worker was told that she had to obey
the orders of a certain foreman and she said that if that were
true, she might as well quit, it was held that she was entitled
to reinstatement plus back pay after being discharged, for there
was no overt act of insubordination.14 So too, where an order
was given to an employee to stop certain past practices, the
prohibition beginning on the next day, there could be no in-
subordination on the day the order was given, even though the
employee said he would not comply.Y5 No cases have been found
where a discharge was grounded on insubordination when the
employee's action consisted solely in failing to carry out an
order without an accompanying verbal challenge of authority.
Whether a discharge for insubordination can be based solely
upon violation of a plant rule, without resistance to a positive
order of a foreman, seems doubtful. In one case,' 6 the discharge
was put on that ground, but since the worker violated the plant
rule under the order of a foreman, there was held to be no in-
subordination.
Arbitrators have been loath to condone conduct of an employee
not responsive to orders. The obvious reason is that if workers
were allowed to decide for themselves whether to heed an order,
it would sap the life of the grievance machinery and cause plant
discipline to break down. Numerous cases have been found
where the arbitrator has denied the relief prayed for by the
employee, either in whole or in part, because the employee failed
"to resort to the grievance procedure.' ' 7
12. In re Goodyear Clearwater Mills and United Textile Workers of
America, Local 90 (AFL), 6 LA 117 (1947).
13. In re Brown & Sharpe Manufacturing Company and International
Association of Machinists, Local 64, Lodges 1088 and 1142, 11 LA 228
(1948).
14. In re National Lock Company and International Union, United Auto-
mobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, Local
449 (CIO), 4 LA 820 (1946).
15. In re Toledo Scale Company and Scale Workers of Ohio, Inc., 1 LA
459 (1945).
16. In re The Masonite Corporation and International Woodworkers of
America (CIO), 10 LA 820 (1948).
17. In re Continental Can Company, Inc. and United Steelworkers of
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Suppose an employee refuses to obey an order upon the ground
that according to his interpretation of the contract, the order is
a violation of it, and suppose it is later found that (1) his inter-
pretation of the contract is correct, or (2) his interpretation is
incorrect? Should it make any difference whether the order is a
clear violation of the contract or is merely a doubtful one? It
seems fairly clear that it makes no difference, and rightly so,
for the determination does not rest in the employee-it is a
question for the grievance committee. Most of the cases so
hold. 8 Nor does it make any difference that the order is a
"clear" violation of the contract. As to this point, arbitrator
Shulman has said:
The only difference between a "clear" violation and a
"doubtful" one, is that the former makes a clear grievance
and the latter a doubtful one. Both must be handled in the
regular prescribed manner.19
The question has arisen whether a discharge can be based upon
irregular conduct of an employee occurring after working hours
and off company premises. In general, the answer is "No."
The company has no control over employees during off-hours.
If it assumed control over them, then it would have to assume
also, responsibility for them, which it surely would not like to
do. The insubordinate conduct must, in some way, affect produc-
tion; if it does not, no action can be taken by the company be-
cause of it.20 An altercation after hours between an employee
America (CIO), 6 LA 363 (1947); In re Shell Pipe Line Corporation and
International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 892 (AFL), 6 LA 458(1947); In re Ingalls Iron Works Company, Inc. and United Steelworkers
of America, Local 1599 (CIO), 8 LA 26 (1947); In re Allis-Chalmers
Manufacturing Company, La Porte Works and United Farm Equipment
and Metal Workers of America, Local 110 (CIO), 8 LA 140 (1947); In re
Roberts Numbering Machine Company and United Electrical, Radio &
Machine Workers of America, Local 1217 (CIO), 9 LA 861 (1948).
18. See cases cited in the previous note. In particular see: In re National
Machine Company and Upholsterers' International Union, Local 25 (AFL)
5 LA 97 (1946); In re Nathan Manufacturing Company and International
Association of Machinists, District 15, Local Lodge 402, 7 LA 3 (1947).
But cf. In re Triumph Explosives, Inc. and United Mine Workers of Amer-
ica, District 50, Local 12774, 2 LA 617 (1945) and In re Goodyear Tire and
Rubber Company of Alabama and United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum and
Plastic Workers of America, Local 12 (CIO), 6 LA 681 (1947), in which
latter case it was held that an honest, although mistaken, belief that the
order violated prior arbitration awards, was a mitigating factor but not a
complete excuse.
19. In re Ford Motor Company, Spring & Upset Building and Interna-
tional Union, United Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Implement
Workers of America, Local 600 (CIO), 3 LA 779 (1944).
20. In re Cutter Laboratories and United Office and Professional Work-
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and his supervisor is remediable in the civil courts and should be
handled there.21 In one case it was suggested that, if production
is affected by after-hours conduct, there might conceivably be
reason for discharge.22
It is no excuse for the worker who disobeys an order that he
has been instructed not to obey by a union steward or committee-
man, although that fact may have some mitigating effect on the
punishment.23 Although the cases dealing with shop stewards
will be discussed later, it is sufficient to say here, that they have
no authority to countermand management's orders; hence, fol-
lowing their orders in contravention to those of management,
will be no excuse to the employee.2'4
The question has also arisen, whether conduct at a grievance
meeting, which would be insubordinate if it had not transpired
during the meeting, should be grounds for disciplinary action.2-
If the worker is directly involved in the grievance meeting, he
should be immune, unless his conduct is outrageous. The reason
is, that the employee and the company are on equal ground at the
grievance meeting and to compel the employee to bow to manage-
ment's orders at that time would restrain the free expression
by the employee of his position in the disputed matter. Further-
more, while the employee is at the grievance meeting he is not
engaged in production so there is no reason to hold him under
the company's control.
The discussion thus far might lead one to believe that an em-
ployee is never justified in refusing to obey a superior's orders.
There are at least two situations, however, in which an order
need not be obeyed. One is an order that directs the employee to
perform some act that is illegal or criminal, and the other is an
order that directs the employee to expose himself to some un-
ers of America, Federation of Architects, Engineers, Chemists and Tech-
nicians, Bio-Lab Union, Local 225 (CIO), 9 LA 187 (1947).
21. In re Pioneer Gen-E-Motors Corporation and United Electrical
Workers of America, Local 1150 (CIO), 3 LA 486 (1946).
22. In re Lou Seidman and Company and Retail, Wholesale and Depart-
ment Store Union, Wholesale and Warehouse Workers Union, Local 65
(CIO), 9 LA 653 (1948).
23. In re Rhode Island Tool Company and United Steelworkers of Amer-
ica, Local 1530 (CIO), 7 LA 113 (1946).
24. In re Ford Motor Company, Spring & Upset Building and Inter-
national Union, United Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Implement
Workers of America, Local 600 (CIO), 3 LA 779 (1944).
25. In re Federal Mining & Smelting Company and International Union
of Mine, Mill & Smelter Workers, Local 489 (CIO), 3 LA 497 (1946).
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usual risk of bodily harm.26 Perhaps there are other situations
that would justify a deliberate refusal to obey an order, but, in
general, it is safe to say, that it is the duty of the employee to
obey.
II. EXTENUATING CIRCUMSTANCES
So far we have considered only whether certain conduct of an
employee constitutes insubordination. We turn now to the ques-
tion of punishment. It is assumed that the conduct merits some
discipline, and the issue is the severity of the punishment.
At the outset, it should be noticed that most contracts give the
power to discipline employees to management.2 7 As pointed out
previously, the company is responsible for production and for
the actions of the employees while engaged in production activi-
ties. With this responsibility must also go authority to discipline
workers for failure to heed orders. Normally, contracts provide
that management may discharge an employee for "proper" or
for "just" cause. Beyond this general statement, the contracts
do not usually go, thus leaving the matter of defining "just
cause" to mediation or arbitration. Because of this, cases are
usually handled on an individual basis, in which all the facts
and circumstances of the particular case are considered and
weighed, to determine whether the conduct is "just cause" for
discharge. The general attitude of arbitrators toward insub-
ordination is summed up well in the following language ex-
tracted from an opinion by arbitrator Hilpert:
Failure to comply with a proper order, or to carry out a
work assignment, is insubordination which is a very serious
industrial offense; and this may in a proper case, subject the
employee to the supreme industrial penalty of discharge.28
However, even though the cases are considered on an individ-
ual basis, this does not preclude the application of generaliza-
tions from prior cases involving the same elements, such as
abusive language, prior warnings, or a long and satisfactory
service record, and so forth. These elements may be described
as extenuating circumstances. Some of them are present in
26. In re Ford Motor Company, Spring & Upset Building and Interna-
tional Union, United Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Implement
Workers of America, Local 600 (CIO), 3 LA 779 (1944).
27. In re Republic Steel Corporation, Gadsden Plant and United Steel-
workers of America (CIO), 11 LA 691 (1948).
28. In re American Car & Foundry Company, St. Charles Plant and
United Steelworkers of America, Local 2409 (CIO), 10 LA 324, 334 (1948),
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almost every case. How the arbitrators have dealt with these
factors is our concern now.
A very interesting and important question is whether, when
there are several incidents, no one of which singly would war-
rant discharge, the incidents may be connected, in order to spell
out a case for imposing the extreme penalty. Two factors are of
considerable moment in answering this question: the time inter-
val between incidents; and whether the employee was warned
at the time of the prior incident that its repetition would lead to
his discharge. One may say, generally, that when the incidents
are relatively frequent over a short period of time, so that the
employee's conduct is "insurgent," then they may be accumu-
lated29 unless they are so minor that they should be overlooked20
When the interval between the incidents is longer, the answer
may depend upon whether the employee was given a warning
at the time of the prior incident that it would be held against
him. One case31 has held that the incidents could not be accumu-
lated because no warning was given. Another case3 2 held that
they could not be accumulated even though a prior warning was
given. The better rule appears to be that when there is a con-
siderable interval between incidents, and neither incident is in
itself of sufficient gravity to warrant discharge, a prior warning
should be given. This will make the employee "watch his step,"
and this is certainly not an unreasonable burden to impose upon
management.
A new factor enters when the plant disciplinary regulations
provide for written reprimand slips, and the foreman did not
make them out on the prior occasions. This situation was in-
29. In re Homestead Valve Manufacturing Company and United Steel-
workers of America, Local 1351 (CIO), 6 LA 627 (1947); In re Bakelite
Corporation and Chemical & Crafts Union, Inc., 1 LA 227 (1945). In the
latter case, the arbitrator said: "It is entirely consistent with the determina-
tion of proper cause that an employee may be found by trial of substantial
duration to be unsuited for particular employment .... The fact that the
conclusion is reached only after extended trial and on the basis of numerous
details independently insufficient is not enough to preclude the exercise of
a fair judgment."
30. In re Utah Ice and Storage Company and United Packinghouse
Workers of America, Local 410 (CIO), 10 LA 814 (1948).
31. In re Finders Manufacturing Company and International Union,
United Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Implement Workers of Amer-
ica, Local 734 (CIO), 3 LA 846 (1946).
32. In re Foote Brothers Gear and Machine Corporation and United
Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers of America, Local 1114 (CIO), 1 LA
561 (1945).
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volved in at least one case, and it was held that the incidents
could not be accumulated.33 The arbitrator felt that, since ex-
press provision had ben made for written reprimands, which
were not issued, the prior misconduct was minor.
Closely allied to accumulation of incidents is the giving of a
warning to an employee of the consequences that will follow his
failure to obey a particular order. No warning need be given to
an employee that serious consequences will flow from disobedi-
ent conduct. 4 Every employee is on notice of that. But when
the contract provides for a warning on first offenses, discharge
is improper.3 5 When an employee receives a personal warning
from his foreman, admonishing him that his disobedience will
be visited with a certain penalty, and the employee is told what
that penalty will be, there is no reason why it may not be im-
posed, so long as it is a reasonable one. 6 So too, when an em-
ployee is warned that punishment will follow if he continues
certain objectionable conduct, and he does not heed the warning,
discipline is clearly in order.17 These situations make out a par-
ticularly strong case against the employee; the unheeded warn-
ing makes his disobedience outright defiance.
A factor often present, and always considered when it is, is
the use by the employee of vile or abusive language in a dispute
with his supervisor. Only one case has been found sustaining a
discharge predicated solely upon the use of abusive language.3 ,
In the usual case, when an employee has been discharged solely
because of vile or abusive language, the arbitrator has ordered
his reinstatement with some loss of pay. 9 When women are
33. In re Bryant Heater Company and International Union, United
Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Implement Workers of America,
Local 337 (CIO), 3 LA 346 (1946).
34. For an extremely harsh case, see In re Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing
Company, La Porte Works and United Farm Equipment and Metal Workers
of America, Local 119 (CIO), 8 LA 140 (1947).
35. In re Cedartown Textiles, Inc. and Textile Workers Union of Amer-
ica, Local 820 (CIO), 8 LA 360 (1947).
36. In re Goodyear Clearwater Mills and United Textile Workers of
America, Local 90 (AFL), 6 LA 760 (1947).
37. In re Republic Steel Corporation, Gadsden Plant and United Steel-
workers of America (CIO), 11 LA 691 (1948).
38. In re Pacific Mills and Textile Workers Union of America, Local 254(CIO), 3 LA 141 (1946) ; and see In re Spencer Kellogg and Sons, Inc. and
United Gas, Coke and Chemical Workers of America, District Council 4
Local I (CIO), I LA 291 (1945); In re Micamold Radio Corporation andUnited Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers of America, Local 430 (CIO),
3 LA 459 (1946).
39. In re Edward F. Behrens, dba Cragin Manufacturers and Interna-
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involved,"° or when the employee has been specifically told to
stop,41 the use of such language constitutes a more serious of-
fense. If the contract provides for summary discharge in cases
of plant disturbance, and the arbitrator decides that the use of
abusive language is such a disturbance, reinstatement is denied.42
Abusive language at a grievance meeting is excused, as indeed,
is insubordination itself.43 In one case the arbitrator ordered
the employee's reinstatement but put him on probation for a
ninety-day period.
4
4
It is hardly necessary to say that vile and abusive language
should be avoided and that its presence in a case tends to weaken
the position of the employee, nevertheless, the employee should
not be condemned to perdition simply because the arbitrator
holds Victorian views on the subject. The arbitrator should take
notice of conditions in the plant and of the nature of the busi-
ness in which the employee is engaged.45 As arbitrator Minton
said in a case involving a taxi-cab driver:
*.. one cannot look for nor expect to find that polished
decorum of a cotillion leader.46
Although it is a rare case indeed when an employee may dis-
tional Association of Machinists, Lodge 1600, 3 LA 746 (1946); In re
Sperry Gyroscope Company, Inc. and United Electrical, Radio & Machine
Workers of America, Local 450 (CIO), 7 LA 621 (1947) (derogatory re-
marks); In re Darnell Wood Products Company, Inc. and United Furniture
Workers of America, Local 282 (CIO), 8 LA 562 (1947); In re Roberts
Numbering Machine Company and United Electrical, Radio & Machine
Workers of America, Local 1217 (CIO), 9 LA 861 (1948).
40. In re Edward F. Behrens dba Cragin Manufacturers and Interna-
tional Association of Machinists, Lodge 1600, 3 LA 746 (1946) (used in
front of a woman); In re Cedartown Textiles, Inc. and Textile Workers
Union of America, Local 820 (CIO), 8 LA 360 (1947) (used by a woman
worker).
41. In re Republic Steel Corporation, Gadsden Plant and United Steel
Workers of America (CIO), 11 LA 691 (1948).
42. In re Dayton Malleable Iron Company, G. H. R. Foundry Division
and United Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers of America, Local 768
(CIO), 8 LA 680 (1947).
43. In re Pioneer Gen-E-Motors Corporation and United Electrical
Workers of America, Local 1150 (CIO), 3 LA 486 (1946). See note 25,
supra.
44. In re Nemirow Company, Inc. and United Furniture Workers of
America, Upholsterers and Springmakers Union, Local 76 (CIO), 10 LA
57 (1948).
45. In re Montrose Chemical Company, Inc. and United Gas, Coke and
Chemical Workers of America, Local 284 (CIO), 10 LA 317 (1948).
46. In re Terminal Cab Company, Inc. and International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, Taxicab
Drivers of Trenton, N. J., Local 433 (AFL), 7 LA 780 (1947).
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regard an order and escape discipline completely, it is always
possible that the conduct of the foreman or the company may
make unfair the imposition of an extreme penalty upon an
insubordinate employee. Thus, when a superior distrusts the
employee without giving him an opportunity to explain his ac-
tions,47 or when a foreman threatens a worker with discharge
when the maximum penalty is loss of seniority,8 or when the dis-
charge is more or less precipitous or inconsistent with a previous
nonchalance in similar incidents, 49 or when the company violates
the contract 5 -- such facts may well be considered as ground for
lightening the penalty.
When the parties are equally at fault, either because of a
"personality clash" between foreman and worker, or for some
other reason, the framing of an award is not easy. One arbi-
trator "split the difference" of lost pay between the company
and the man but stated that he did not like to do it.5' When the
trouble can be attributed to a "personality clash" between the
worker and his foreman, the cases hold that some penalty may
be imposed upon the employee, but that he cannot be dis-
charged.5 2 One arbitrator reinstated the employee with some
47. In re Toledo Scale Company and Scale Workers of Ohio, Inc., 1 LA
459 (1945); In re North American Aviation, Inc. and United Automobile,
Aircraft and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, Local 887
(CIO), 10 LA 304 (1948).
48. In re The Moore Enameling and Manufacturing Company and Fed-
eral Labor Union, Stamping and Enameling Workers Union, Local 20113(AFL), 7 LA 459 (1947).
49. In re Franklin Tanning Company and International Fur and Leather
Workers Union, Local 31 (CIO), 9 LA 167 (1947); In re Dairyman's
League Cooperative Association, Inc. and International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, Local 584
(AFL), 11 LA 1113 (1948).
50. In re Ford Motor Company and United Automobile, Aircraft and
Agricultural Implement Workers of America, Local 600 (CIO), 11 LA 213(1948) in which the arbitrator distinguished the case from a former de-
cision by himself in In re Ford Motor Company, Spring and Upset Building
and International Union, United Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Im-
plement Workers of America, Local 600 (CIO), 3 LA 779 (1944).
51. In re Borden's Farm Products, Inc. and International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers, Local 584, Unit 2(AFL), 3 LA 480 (1944).
52. In re Bakelite Corporation and Chemical and Crafts Union, Inc., 1
LA 227 (1945); In re A. B. C. Steel and Wire Company and Playthings,
Jewelry and Novelty Workers International Union, United Wire and Metal
Workers Union, Local 36 (CIO), 7 LA 479 (1947); In re Stern Brothers
and Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union, Local 5 (CIO), 9 LA
464 (1948); In re American Car and Foundry Company, St. Charles Plant
and United Steelworkers of America, Local 2409 (CIO), 10 LA 324 (1948).
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loss of pay and recommended that he be transferred to another
department.53
The foreman's conduct may possibly completely exculpate the
worker.54 Then, too, we find cases in which the supervisor is
prejudiced against the worker because of his color, and the dis-
charge is falsely based on insubordination. 5
Another mitigating factor that is almost always considered
is the employee's length of satisfactory service with the com-
pany.
5 6
Some interesting problems are raised by events which occur
after the incident upon which the discharge is based but before
the grievance meeting. If the worker stays away after an alter-
cation with a foreman, or refuses to come to work after being
ordered to, the worker may possibly be discharged for absentee-
ism; but he is almost surely liable to punishment for insubordi-
nation.-7 He should continue to work and resort to the grievance
machinery. If a worked disciplined for insubordination apolo-
gizes to the foreman, that will not affect his case.58 Similarly,
reinstatement of the employee after a discharge for insubordi-
53. In re Dayton Malleable Iron Company, G. H. R. Foundry Division
and United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America, Local 768
(CIO), 8 LA 680 (1947).
54. In re Daily World Publishing Company and The Newspaper Guild of
Philadelphia and Camden, Local 10 (CIO), 3 LA 815 (1946); but see In
re Continental Can Company, Inc. and United Steel Workers of America
(CIO), 6 LA 363 (1947).
55. In re Bethlehem Steel Company, Shipbuilding Division and Industrial
Union of Marine and Shipbuilding Workers of America, Local 9 (CIO),
2 LA 187 (1945) ; see also In re Haslett Compress Company and Interna-
tional Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union, Local 6 (CIO), 7 LA
762 (1947).
56. In re Joy Manufacturing Company, Sullivan Division and United
Steelworkers of America, Local 2944 (CIO), 6 LA 430 (1946); In re
Franklin Tanning Company and International Fur and Leather Workers'
Union, Local 31 (CIO), 9 LA 167 (1947); In re WLEU Broadcasting Cor-
poration and American Communications Association (CIO), 7 LA 150
(1947).
57. In re Spencer Kellogg and Sons, Inc. and United Gas, Coke, and
Chemical Workers of America, District Council 4, Local I (CIO), I LA 291
(1945) ; In re Ingalls Iron Works Company, Inc. and United Steelworkers
of America, Local 1599 (CIO), 8 LA 26 (1947). But see In re Bethlehem
Steel Company, Inc. and Unted Steelworkers of America, Local 2604 (CIO),
11 LA 629 (1948).
58. In re Armstrong Cork Company, 27th Street Plant and United Rub-
ber Workers of America, Local 256 (CIO), 1 LA 574 (1946) ; In re Pure Oil
Company, Smiths Bluff Refinery and Oil Workers International Union,
Local 228 (CIO), 11 LA 333 (1948).
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nation is not an admission by the company that it was in error,
which entitles the employee to lost pay 9
The cases involving shop stewards, committeemen, and other
union officials, have sometimes varied from the general pattern.
When the discharge of a union official is based upon insubordi-
nate conduct in connection with his production activities, the
results should be, and in the main have been, the same as in
other cases. If there is any discrimination against him because
of his union activity, there would doubtless be a violation of the
Federal labor law.
The general rule concerning the right of a steward to counter-
mand management's instructions, is well stated by Mr. Shulman
in In re Ford Motor Co., in which he says:
The undisputed testimony as to the policy of the building
and the disputed testimony as to what X's instructions
actually were are both premised on the assumption that a
committeeman may countermand supervision's orders and
instruct employees not to do what supervision requires.
That assumption is wrong. And it should be clearly under-
stood that it is wrong.
No committeeman or other union officer is entitled to in-
struct employees to disobey supervision's orders no matter
how strongly he may believe that the orders are in violation
of agreement. If he believes that an improper order has
been issued, his course is to take the matter up with super-
vision and seek to effect an adjustment. Failing to effect
an adjustment, he may file a grievance. But he may not tell
the employee to disregard the order c0
The awards in cases in which shop stewards have counter-
manded orders have varied considerably. Some have denied
reinstatement altogether ;61 others have awarded reinstatement,
but with some loss of pay ;G2 still others have awarded reinstate-
59. In re United States Cartridge Company and United Electrical, Radio
& Machine Workers of America, 825 (CIO), 1 LA 494 (1945).
60. In re Ford Motor Company, Spring & Upset Building and Interna-
tional Union, Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Implement Workers of
America, Local 600 (CIO), 3 LA 779 (1944). In that case, the arbitrator
awarded reinstatement with four days loss of pay because of mitigating
factors.
61. In re Nathan Manufacturing Company and International Association
of Machinists, District 15, Local Lodge 402, 7 LA 3 (1947); In re The
Texas Company and Oil Workers International Union, Local 23 (CIO),
7 LA 735 (1947).
62. In re Welin, Davit and Boat Corporation, 3 LA 126 (1942); In re
Rhode Island Tool Company and United Steelworkers of America, Local
1530 (CIO), 7 LA 113 (1946); In re Roberts Numbering Machine Company
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ment with full back pay.63 Shop stewards usually have permis-
sion to leave their jobs to engage in union activities, provided
that they notify their foreman as to where they are going.
Arbitrators have been fairly lenient when this privilege has been
abused by failure to notify the foreman.64 When the steward
has acted under advice from the union officers, and has been
discharged for insubordination, the arbitrators again have shown
clemency because the fault lies primarily with the union, and to
impose a severe penalty upon the steward would make him a
"scapegoat."8 5
It is not entirely clear how the order's being in violation of
existing custom in the plant affects the award. Logically, it
seems that custom must fade completely out of the picture in the
face of an express order. One case has so held.63 On the other
hand, it has definitely been held to mitigate against discharge67
The case most strongly showing the effect of custom is In re
Bethlehem Steel CoY.7 The employee was discharged for taking
"scraps" of metal belonging to the company against express
orders of the foreman. The evidence at the hearing showed that
the employees at the plant were on an honor system, or "code,"
which permitted the taking of small items of company property,
and that the company did not object to this practice. The value
of the articles taken by this employee, however, was slightly
and United Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers of America, Local 1217
(CIO), 9 LA 861 (1948).
63. In re American Transformer Company and United Electrical, Radio
& Machine Workers of America, Local 415 (CIO), 1 LA 456 (1945); In re
Finders Manufacturing Company and International Union, United Auto-
mobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, Local
734 (CIO), 3 LA 846 (1946).
64. In re Joy Manufacturing Company, Sullivan Division and United
Steelworkers of America, Local 2944 (CIO), 6 LA 430 (1946) (reinstate-
ment with back pay); In re Johnson-Stephens & Shinkle Shoe Company and
The Boot and Shoe Workers of America, Local 714 (AFL), 7 LA 422(1947) (reinstatement without back pay on condition that steward resign
from that position in union).
65. In re Modernage Furniture Corporation and Retail Furniture and
Floor Covering Employees Union, Local 853, URWDSEA (CIO), 3 La 680
(1946); In re Rhode Island Tool Company and United Steelworkers of
America, Local 1530 (CIO), 7 LA 113 (1946).
66. In re Pacific Mills and Textile Workers Union of America, Local 254
(CIO), 3 LA 141 (1946).
67. In re Daily World Publishing Company and The Newspaper Guild of
Philadelphia and Camden, Local 10 (CIO), 3 LA 815 (1946); In re Joy
Manufacturing Company, Sullivan Division and United Steelworkers of
America, Local 2944 (CIO), 6 LA 430 (1946).
67a. In re Bethlehem Steel Company, Inc., Cornwall Ore Mines and
United Steelworkers of America, Local 2657 (CIO), 12 LA 167 (1949).
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higher than the value of articles normally taken by employees.
The arbitrator considered all the facts and circumstances and
-awarded reinstatement, but without back pay; he held that the
,offense was aggravated by violation of the "code."
A closely allied problem arises when the company has, in the
past, been lax in administering discipline to workers in similar
cases. It cannot be argued that because of the laxity the com-
pany has lost its right to impose disciplinary penalties at all in
the future; and yet a reasonable inference may be drawn that
the company is discriminating against the particular employee."8
Against this inference is the sound doctrine that discipline is an
individual matter, based upon a particular infraction by a par-
ticular person.6 9 The solution lies in reconciliation of the two
ideas, permitting individual treatment, yet limiting the company
-to a penalty not unreasonably divergent from past practices.
III. AWARDS
The arbitrators' awards in insubordination cases have varied
from discharge of the insubordinate employee to reinstatement
with back pay, with intermediate awards depending upon miti-
-gating factors. Some arbitrators, perhaps the majority, reach
a decision on the merits and then make an award without con-
sidering the nature or severity of the penalty imposed by the
company, over which the dispute has often, at least in part,
-arisen. Other arbitrators consider the penalty imposed by the
company to see how serious the company thought the infraction
-was. Some labor contracts limit the arbitrator's power to reduce
the penalty imposed by the company to cases in which the com-
pany's action is clearly wrong. Even without such a limiting
clause, some arbitrators have so restricted themselves."0
Much difficulty in making a fair award arises when the em-
-ployee, usually a shop steward, has clearly been insubordinate
but has acted in response to the union's orders. Then the em-
68. In re Victor Industries Corporation and United Automobile, Aircraft
and Agricultural Implement Workers, Local 259 (CIO), 11 LA 997 (1948).
69. In re Continental Can Company, Inc. and United Steelworkers of
America (CIO), 6 LA 363 (1947).
70. In re Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Comanpy, La Porte Works and
United Farm Equipment and Metal Workers of America, Local 119 (CIO)
.8 LA 140 (1947); In re Terminal Cab Company, Inc. and International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of
America, Taxicab Drivers of Trenton, N. J., Local 433 (AFL), 7 LA 780
,(1947).
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ployee is placed in a very precarious situation: if he follows the
union's orders, he risks discharge by the company; if he follows
the company's orders, he risks being expelled from the union,
or losing his position as shop steward. The arbitrators have not
dealt satisfactorily with this problem. Usually some penalty is.
imposed upon the worker, thus making him a martyr.71 For this,
the arbitrator cannot be blamed entirely, for the fault lies in the
want of power to reach the union and the union officials.
In some cases, the worker is either entirely blameless, merit-
ing no penalty whatsoever, or his conduct does not warrant as
severe a penalty as the arbitrator has imposed. Still arbitrators
have imposed penalties on management's claim that to impose
no penalty would destroy plant discipline ;72 or the arbitrators,
interested in encouraging resort to the grievance machinery,
make awards that will act as deterrents to other employees who
consider "self-help." 73 Such "scape-goat" awards do not seem
proper. HAROLD B. BAMBURG
LOAFING AND LEAVING POST
Loafing and leaving post, as conducts subject to discipline, are
very closely related and often hard to distinguish. An employee
may loaf, or he may leave his post, or he may leave his post for
the purpose of loafing. However, with knowledge that the prob-
lem of distinguishing them exists, for the purposes of this article
an arbitrary distinction will be made. That conduct which takes
an employee away from his regular place of work will be desig-
nated leaving post, while that which occurs on his post will be
designated loafing.
I. LOAFING
Loafing, which Webster defines as "to spend time in idleness;
to lounge or loiter about or along," is a rather abstract concept,
and therefore difficult to handle. As loafing is to a great extent
71. In re Rhode Island Tool Company and United Steelworkers of Amer-
ica, Local 1530 (CIO), 7 LA 113 (1946); In re Franklin Tanning Company
and International Fur and Leather Workers Union, Local 31 (CIO), 9 LA
167 (1947).
72. In re Dairymen's League Cooperative Association, Inc. and Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers
of America, Local 584 (AFL), 11 LA 1113 (1948).
73. In re Continental Can Company, Inc. and United Steelworkers of
America (CIO), 6 LA 363 (1947).
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